

# Paying Adolescents for Health Screenings Works

by

Martin Halla

Gerald J. Pruckner

Thomas Schober

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Corresponding author: [martin.halla@jku.at](mailto:martin.halla@jku.at)

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Christian Doppler Laboratory  
Aging, Health and the Labor Market  
[cdecon.jku.at](http://cdecon.jku.at)

Johannes Kepler University  
Department of Economics  
Altenberger Strasse 69  
4040 Linz, Austria

# Paying Adolescents for Health Screenings Works<sup>†</sup>

Martin Halla<sup>a,b,c,d</sup>, Gerald J. Pruckner<sup>a,c</sup>, Thomas Schober<sup>a,c</sup>

<sup>a</sup>*Johannes Kepler University of Linz*

<sup>b</sup>*IZA, Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn*

<sup>c</sup>*Christian Doppler Laboratory Aging, Health and the Labor Market, Linz*

<sup>d</sup>*GÖG, Austrian Public Health Institute, Vienna*

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## Abstract

With regard to their future health, adolescents are at a critical stage. Previous evaluations have shown that health screenings, counselling, and other intervention programmes during this phase of life are important, particularly for those with a low socio-economic background. Unfortunately, adolescents tend to have little interest in preventive programmes. We designed a field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives to promote participation in health screenings. Our study comprises more than 10,000 participants, observed via high-quality administrative data from Austria. The treatment group received a €40 shopping voucher if they participated in an age-specific health screening. On average, the financial incentive increased the likelihood of participation by 280 %. Treatment effects are comparably larger for children in families with a higher socio-economic status, and of parents with a revealed preference for secondary health prevention.

*JEL Classification:* I12, J13, I18, I14, H51, H75.

*Keywords:* Health screenings, financial incentives, adolescence, early intervention, secondary prevention.

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<sup>†</sup>Corresponding author: Gerald J. Pruckner, Johannes Kepler University of Linz, Department of Economics, Altenberger Straße 69, 4040 Linz, Austria; ph.: +43 (0)732 2468 7777; email: gerald.pruckner@jku.at. We would like to thank the “Social Insurance Institution for the Self Employed” (*Sozialversicherungsanstalt der Selbständigen*, SVS) for support in planning and executing the experiment. In particular, we want to thank Michael Müller. We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Austrian Federal Ministry of Education, Science, and Research (BMBWF), and the National Foundation for Research, Technology, and Development.

# 1 Introduction

Adolescence and puberty are marked by important physiological and psychological changes. Particularly during these turbulent periods, young people face choices with potential consequences for their future health and human capital. A healthy lifestyle, positive social influences, and educational achievements affect current health, schooling, and family life, but they also co-determine adult outcomes (van den Berg et al., 2014). In high-income countries, the vast majority of adolescents are healthy by traditional medical standards, but they face a number of significant threats to their health in this phase of life. This age group is at particular risk of starting smoking tobacco, alcohol and drug abuse, experiencing self-harm and interpersonal violence, and engaging in unprotected or non-consensual sex. These behaviours have an impact on the trajectory of life and contribute to adult morbidity and mortality.

Longitudinal studies demonstrate that this period is also an age of opportunity that can help adolescents to break early patterns that may lead to ill health and social disadvantage (Richter, 2006). Interventions such as guidance on a healthy lifestyle, support from family and school, and access to supportive services are recommended to promote adolescents’ well-being. Medical advice in the field of primary prevention and the early recognition of potential health deficits are important instruments of health promotion at this age. Moreover, the use of medical counselling and participation in secondary health screenings may generate benefits for adult well-being, and even the next generation of children. Hendren and Sprung-Keyser (2020) demonstrate that direct investments in low-income children’s health have historically had the highest return among a large number of US tax and expenditure policies.<sup>1</sup>

Unfortunately, only a few adolescents utilise preventive health care services (Ma et al., 2005; Nordin et al., 2010). Those with low socio-economic background are least likely to receive a preventative care visit (Yu et al., 2001; Irwin, Jr et al., 2009). One possibility to increase participation in health screening exams are financial incentives. To evaluate this strategy, we performed a field experiment with more than 10,000 adolescents observed using high-quality administrative data from Austria. Our randomised controlled trial (RCT) was conducted in cooperation with an Austrian statutory health insurance provider.<sup>2</sup> The screening examination itself, referred to as the *Health Check Junior (HCJ)*, is free of charge. It comprises a detailed anamnesis, including a general health check and extensive medical advice on age-specific health risks and lifestyle issues. This set-up has several methodological advantages. First, we could draw our participants from a well-

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<sup>1</sup>Importantly, the return to health policies (captured by the so-called “marginal value of public fund”) is constant across all ages (Hendren and Sprung-Keyser, 2020), and does not diminish with age as previously assumed (Heckman, 2006).

<sup>2</sup>Our partner, the “Social Insurance Institution for Businesses” (*Sozialversicherungsanstalt der gewerblichen Wirtschaft*) provides compulsory health insurance for all self-employed people and their relatives.

defined and accessible subject pool. Second, we have access to administrative records, which allow us to observe participants before and after treatment. Thus, we have precise information on outcomes, and are able to generate rich control and stratification variables. Third, the health screenings are offered in a standard outpatient setting by contracted primary-care physicians. We were able to measure our outcome variable, screening participation, without any extra effort and free of error.

The treatment group was offered a €40 shopping voucher for participation in an age-specific health screening programme. The control group received an equivalent invitation, but without a financial incentive. Our results revealed a statistically significant treatment effect of 6.7 percentage points (pp). Relative to the low participation of 2.4 % in the control group, the treatment effect represents an increase of 280 %. We find evidence for substantial treatment effect heterogeneity. The incentive was found to work significantly better for children in families with a higher socio-economic status (SES), and of parents with a revealed preference for secondary health prevention.

Our findings add to a small body of literature. To date, there are only a handful of studies on financial incentives for health screenings of adolescents. Evidence is available for specific programmes, such as treatment for latent tuberculosis infection (Kominski et al., 2007), glucose monitoring adherence and glycaemic control (Wong et al., 2017), and HIV testing (Kranzer et al., 2018). There is comparably more evidence for children (below the age of five)<sup>3</sup> and adults<sup>4</sup>, which demonstrates the effectiveness of financial incentives for secondary prevention.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the relevant institutional background. Section 3 describes our experimental design and the collected data. Section 4 presents our estimated treatment effects, and section 5 concludes the paper.

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<sup>3</sup>The majority of these studies are from low- and middle-income countries. Recent meta-analyses conclude that financial incentives are effective in increasing the use of preventive services (Lagarde et al., 2007; Bassani et al., 2013). Evidence from high-income countries is rare. One recent exception is an evaluation of an Austrian developmental screening programme for children at the ages of 2, 3, and 4 years (Halla et al., 2016). A financial incentive of €185 increased the likelihood of participating in all three examinations by about 46 %. A smaller number of studies have tested financial incentives for primary intervention. In particular, there is evidence on the effectiveness of financial incentives for the consumption of fruits and vegetables at lunchtime in primary schools (Just and Price, 2003; Belot et al., 2016; Loewenstein et al., 2016).

<sup>4</sup>Evidence for adults is from high-income countries and available for chlamydia testing (Dolan and Rudisill, 2014), colorectal cancer screening (Gupta et al., 2016; Mehta et al., 2019), and faecal occult blood tests (Kullgren et al., 2014). There are also a number of studies on financial incentives in the promotion of primary prevention, such as breastfeeding (Relton et al., 2018), exercise (Charness and Gneezy, 2009; Royer et al., 2015), nutrition (Mochon et al., 2017), smoking cessation (Volpp et al., 2009), weight loss (Volpp et al., 2008; Jeffery, 2012; Cawley and Price, 2013), and comprehensive workplace wellness programmes (Jones et al., 2019).



## 2 Institutional setting

In this section, we briefly describe the relevant institutional setting. First, we provide general information on the Austrian health care system. Second, we discuss existing health screening programmes and introduce the new programme for adolescents.

### 2.1 Austrian health care system

Austria has a Bismarckian-type health care system with almost universal access to high-quality medical services. Depending on occupation and place of residence, individuals are assigned to one (out of 18) particular health insurance fund. Insurance is mandatory and there is no choice regarding the insurance fund or package. All health insurance funds cover almost all medical expenses in the inpatient and outpatient sector including medication. The outpatient expenditures are funded by social security payments. Expenditures for hospitalisation are co-financed by social security contributions and tax revenues from different federal levels. Patients usually pay a prescription charge for medication, and a small deductible per day for hospitalisation. Our study focuses on children of self-employed persons. This group is insured with the “Social Insurance Institution for Businesses” (*Sozialversicherungsanstalt der gewerblichen Wirtschaft*, SVA).<sup>5</sup>

### 2.2 Existing health screenings programmes

Traditionally, the Austrian health care system has offered two structured and nation-wide health screening programmes. First, the so-called “Mother-Child-Pass Examination Program (MCPEP)” has been advocated for pregnant mothers and their newborns. Over time, the aim and scope of this programme have expanded, and it now lasts until the 5th year of the child’s life (Halla et al., 2016). Second, insurants beyond 18 years old are offered a general health screening (Hackl et al., 2015). In both programmes, screening examinations are conducted by primary-care physicians and fully covered by health insurance funds. Until 2016, there was no screening programme available for the 6 to 17 year age group.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>SVA resolved after our sample period. As of January 1, 2020 the SVA and the “Social Insurance Institution for Farmers” (*Sozialversicherungsanstalt der Bauern*, SVB) have been merged into the “Social Insurance Institution for the Self Employed” (*Sozialversicherungsanstalt der Selbständigen*, SVS). In contrast to most other Austrian health insurance funds, the SVA/SVS charges a 20 % co-payment for outpatient medical treatment. Minors are exempt from this payment. There are no further important peculiarities.

<sup>6</sup>The exception to this are school health checks during compulsory education. They include the child’s medical history as reported by the parents and a physical examination by a school doctor with a focus on the development status of the child or adolescent. However, the examinations are neither centrally organised nor are the data collected in a structured way.

## 2.3 New programme: Health Check Junior

On October 1, 2016, the SVA introduced a nation-wide health screening programme for children and young people between 6 and 17 years of age. The HCJ programme closes the gap between the aforementioned nation-wide screening programmes. The medical examinations are also conducted by primary-care physicians (general practitioners or paediatricians) and are fully funded by the SVA.<sup>7</sup> It distinguishes between a track for younger (6-11 years) and older (12-17 years) participants, which differ in content to account for age.

The aim of HCJ is to identify health risks in young people at an early stage, strengthen health awareness, implement preventive measures in the event of unhealthy lifestyles, and provide support in important developmental phases such as school enrolment or puberty. The primary-care physician determines the health status of children and adolescents and addresses the most relevant lifestyle issues for these age groups such as nutrition, exercise, media consumption, and substance abuse.<sup>8</sup> Until now, the SVA (SVS) is the only health insurance fund that offers a screening programme for this age group.

## 3 Field experiment

Our RCT was implemented during the pilot phase of HCJ. From 2013 until September 2016, the programme was offered only in the federal states Burgenland and Vienna.<sup>9</sup> These two federal states comprise about one quarter of the Austrian population. In an attempt to test the effectiveness of a financial incentive for participation in this new health screening programme, the experiment was conducted in collaboration with the SVA.

### 3.1 Sample definition

The SVA register provided us with a well-defined and accessible subject pool. For our trial, we selected all families with at least one child between 9 and 17 years of age.<sup>10</sup> The principal insured parent must have lived in the federal state of Vienna or Burgenland and have been insured with the SVA at least from 2012 to 2014. Another inclusion criterion was positive health care expenditures in either 2012 or 2013. Conversely, families with a child whose two-year health care expenditures (2012 and 2013) were above the 98th percentile of €8,378 were excluded. This provided us with a sample of 10,727 adolescents.

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<sup>7</sup>In 2020, the honorarium for physicians amounts to €80.70 per HCJ examination.

<sup>8</sup>The medical examination form (translated from German) is included in Appendix Figure A.1.

<sup>9</sup>In the meantime, the screening programme has been extended to cover the whole of Austria.

<sup>10</sup>We did not include children between 6 and 8 years since our focus is on puberty/adolescence.

### 3.2 Randomisation

Although programme participation is basically a joint decision between parents and children, depending on the age of the child, we reached out directly to those concerned. All adolescents in our subject pool received an age-specific invitation letter via mail.<sup>11</sup> This letter introduced the new HCJ programme and encouraged them to participate. It included an age-appropriate explanation of the rationale for secondary prevention:

*The great thing about preventive health screenings is that you don't see the doctor when you are sick, but before, when you are still healthy. This way you can help your body not to get sick in the first place.*

We randomly assigned approximately 38 % of all children to the treatment group ( $N = 4,103$ ), and 62 % to the control group ( $N = 6,624$ ). The control group was only motivated by the provided information. For the treatment group, the letter included additional information on the financial incentive. This group was offered a €40 shopping voucher if they participated in the HCJ. The wording of the additional text included in the letter (translated to English) is as follows:

*For participating in HCJ, you will receive a shopping voucher worth €40 for Mariahilfer Strasse in Vienna as a thank you. The SVA will send you this voucher as soon as you have completed the medical check-up.*

Mariahilfer Strasse is the largest and one of the most famous shopping streets in Vienna. In families with multiple children, all children were assigned to the same group. The SVA distributed the letters via mail around June 1, 2014. This was the first information campaign addressing insurance holders. Contracted physicians were informed about the pilot phase of HCJ in the first quarter of 2014. They received detailed information about the intention and content of the programme, as well as their reimbursement, but not about our subsequent intervention.

### 3.3 Pre-determined variables

One particular strength of our field experiment is that we can observe our subjects before and after treatment via high-quality register data. The adolescents were typically co-insured with the principal insured parent, who can also be observed in the register. Information about father and mother is available, if both parents are self-employed, or if one parent is co-insured with their spouse. For the 10,727 adolescents in the sample, we observed 4,485 principal and 2,604 co-insured mothers, and 7,321 principal and

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<sup>11</sup>The letters (translated into English) sent to young (9-11 years) and older (12-17 years) subjects are included in Appendix Figure A.2 and Figure A.3.

582 co-insured fathers.<sup>12</sup> We can link these data to other administrative records, most importantly to the *Austrian Social Security Database* (ASSD). These data include administrative records to verify pension claims and provide information on earnings (Zweimüller et al., 2009).

We use information on the adolescent’s sex, age, and place of residence to generate basic demographic control variables. In further specifications, we additionally control for the socio-economic background of their family, and the principal insured parent’s health screening behaviour. The former is captured with different indicators, such as migration background, parental education, and earnings. The latter is based on information on past participation in general health screening for adults. We also used this information to stratify the sample, and to explore treatment effect heterogeneity.

Table 1 provides an overview of all pre-determined variables used. Adolescents are on average 12.8 years old, roughly half of them are female, and 87% live in Vienna. About a quarter of principal parents have foreign citizenship. Their median annual income between 2012 and 2014 amounted to €20,746 for males, and €11,727 for females. A fifth participated in the general health screening for adults in either 2012 or 2013.

In line with our randomisation, we see that all adolescents’ and their parents’ characteristics are balanced across control and treatment group. Thus, there are no significant differences. This also holds true for adolescents’ health at birth. For the majority (about 85 %) of observations, we obtain information on gestation, birth weight, and the Apgar score.<sup>13</sup>

## 4 Estimation results

To examine the effect of the treatment voucher<sub>*i*</sub> on the likelihood of screening participation HCJ<sub>*i*</sub>, we estimate a simple linear probability model,

$$\text{HCJ}_i = \beta \cdot \text{voucher}_i + \gamma \cdot \text{female}_i + \delta \cdot \text{age}_i + \eta \cdot \text{Vienna}_i + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where we control for subject’s sex (female<sub>*i*</sub>), age (age<sub>*i*</sub>), and place of residence (Vienna<sub>*i*</sub>) in the baseline specification. In further specifications, we also control for the principal insured parent’s income and health screening behaviour, and the mother’s level of education. The error term is denoted by  $\epsilon_i$ . We calculate standard errors clustered at the family level. Our sample comprises 5,103 families with one child, 2,155 with two children, and 419 with three or more children.

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<sup>12</sup>If both parents are self-employed, we define the mother as the principal parent.

<sup>13</sup>This information is provided in the *Austrian Birth Register*. Not all adolescents can be linked to this data source, most notably because births outside Austria are not recorded in this register.

## 4.1 Average treatment effects

The estimation results are summarised in Table 2. Column (1) shows the unconditional treatment effect. The financial incentive of a €40 shopping voucher increases the average treated subject’s likelihood of participation by 6.7 pp. The effect is statistically (p-value < 0.01) and economically significant. Given the participation rate of 2.4 % in the control group, the estimated coefficient represents an increase of 280 %. As expected, due to randomisation, the impact of the shopping voucher on HCJ participation does not depend on the inclusion of controls. In column (2), we control for the subject’s age, sex, and place of residence. In columns (3) to (6), we additionally stepwise control for the principal insured parent’s income, their health screening behaviour, and the mother’s educational attainment. The estimated treatment effects remain unchanged.<sup>14</sup>

Figure 1 illustrates the development of HCJ participation over time in the treatment and control groups. Participation is found to have increased continuously in both groups after receipt of the invitation letters as of June 1, 2014 (the dotted vertical line). However, the gradient in the treatment group is comparatively steeper. The participation rate among the treatment group is around 8 % after one year. The equivalent rate for the control group amounts to less than 2 %. A small number of adolescents had already participated in HCJ before our intervention. This participation was initiated by contracted physicians, who had known about HGJ since the first quarter of 2014.

## 4.2 Treatment effect heterogeneity

To test whether the shopping voucher has a different impact across subgroups, we repeated our analysis using sub-samples. We consider three dimensions: basic demographic characteristics, socio-economic background, and parental health screening behaviour. Figure 2 shows point estimates and corresponding 95% confidence intervals based on several sample splits. The p-values reported next to the bars indicate the statistical significance of the difference between these two estimated coefficients.<sup>15</sup>

First, we consider the sample splits by subject’s sex. Female subjects are somewhat more responsive (7.3 vs. 6.1 pp), but the difference is not statistically significant. Second, we are interested in the adolescents’ socio-economic backgrounds. We see two main channels. On the one hand, households with a lower socio-economic background could be more responsive due to an income effect. On the other hand, attention and inter-

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<sup>14</sup>The estimation output reveals a higher HCJ participation for females (1.2 pp) and for adolescents who live in Vienna (1.6 pp), while the participation rate decreases by 0.3 pp with each year of age. We also find a significant and positive impact on participation if the principal parent earns an income above the median (1.4 pp), and if they themselves had participated in a general preventive health check in 2012 or 2013 (2.7 pp). The mother’s level of education is *ceteris paribus* not statistically significant.

<sup>15</sup>These p-values are based on estimations using the full sample with interactions between the respective group indicator and all other covariates. Appendix Table A.1 includes detailed estimation output for these (and other) split-sample analyses.

est towards preventive health care may require a certain level of health literacy, which can be expected to be lower in households with a lower socio-economic background. We use three different indicators for the socio-economic background: citizenship, educational attainment, and earnings. Generally, we measure these indicators for the principal insured parent.<sup>16</sup> However, due to the higher number of missing data entries for fathers' educational attainment, we use maternal education in our baseline specification. Adolescents with a foreign principal insured parent respond comparably less (4.9 vs. 7.2 pp). The difference is significant at the 8% level only. Existing language barriers and lack of knowledge about the health care system in general may explain their lower health literacy.<sup>17</sup> Responsiveness increases with mother's educational attainment. Children of mothers with upper secondary or tertiary education show the highest treatment effect (8.1 pp), and those with mothers with compulsory schooling show the lowest (2.9 pp). An equivalent pattern is present for children of a principal parent with a low (5.6 pp) versus high (7.7 pp) income. Thus, across all indicators, we find consistent evidence for stronger treatment effects among adolescents with a higher SES. This is in line with the idea that awareness/preference for secondary prevention compensates for any income effect.<sup>18</sup>

Third, interesting results emerge with regard to differentiation as to whether the parents themselves attend health screenings. The voucher effect for adolescents whose principal insured parent attended a general health check in the past runs up to 10.1 pp. In comparison, the treatment increases participation by only 5.9 pp for children whose main insured parent did not participate in this programme. Again, we obtain equivalent results based on father's or mother's characteristics (see Appendix Table A.1). This substantial gradient underlines the importance of awareness/preference for secondary prevention within the household for the effectiveness of the financial incentive.

In summary, the analysis of treatment heterogeneity suggests that the financial incentive is comparably less effective among adolescents from households with a stronger baseline resistance to secondary prevention.

## 5 Conclusions

We performed a large-scale field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives in promoting health screening examinations among adolescents. A €40 shopping

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<sup>16</sup>We obtain equivalent results if we use the father's or mother's (instead of the principal insured parent's) characteristics (see Appendix Table A.1).

<sup>17</sup>The fact that foreign-born mothers are less responsive to monetary incentives is supported by the results of the aforementioned study on participation in a nation-wide developmental screening programme for pre-schoolers in Austria (Halla et al., 2016). The authors find that foreign-born mothers react significantly less to the financial incentive than their Austria-born counterparts and mention a lack of language proficiency and institutional knowledge as plausible explanations for this finding.

<sup>18</sup>The social gradient in the effectiveness of the financial incentive is less pronounced in terms of relative treatment effects (measured in %), since baseline participation rates tend to be lower among households with lower socio-economic backgrounds (see column 2 of Appendix Table A.1).

voucher increases participation from 2.4 to 9.1%. Thus, the financial incentive almost quadruples participation relative to a personalised invitation, which provides information only. Our finding adds to the existing evidence documenting the effectiveness of financial incentives for secondary prevention among other age groups.

We do not find support for the hypothesis that financial incentives have a stronger impact for families with a lower SES, who are likely to benefit more from early intervention. Rather, our results indicate that the financial incentive is more effective among children from families with a higher SES, and those with a revealed preference for own (adult) health screenings. Thus, any income effect seems of minor importance relative to the higher health awareness and health literacy more present among families with a higher SES. It is well-known that parents tend to pass on their health behaviour to their children. Our finding suggests that financial incentives for secondary prevention are not able to resolve any pre-existing social gradient, but rather amplify differences.<sup>19</sup>

We conclude that financial incentives help to increase participation in health screening exams among adolescents and could have a positive influence on subsequent health (behaviour). Unfortunately, the tool is comparably less effective in engaging those groups who would benefit the most. A further downside is that substantial financial incentives within public health care would shift costs onto lower-income and probably unhealthier insurance holders if these groups continue to participate at lower rates. However, a comprehensive incidence analysis must also take the different contribution rates of socio-economic groups into account.

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<sup>19</sup>Jones et al. (2019) document an equivalent selection pattern for adults in the context of a comprehensive workplace wellness programme in the US.

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## 6 Tables and Figures to be placed in paper

Table 1: Average pre-determined characteristics of treatment and control group

	(1) Control	(2) Treated	(3) Difference	(4) <i>p</i> -value
Individual characteristics				
Age	12.9	12.8	0.1	0.255
Female	0.49	0.50	-0.01	0.471
Lives in Vienna	0.88	0.87	0.01	0.225
Principal parent's characteristics				
Foreign citizenship	0.26	0.25	0.01	0.311
General health check participation <sup>†</sup>	0.20	0.19	0.00	0.913
High income (above median) <sup>‡</sup>	0.53	0.52	0.01	0.471
Mother's education				
Compulsory education	0.11	0.12	-0.01	0.322
Vocational/lower sec. educ.	0.26	0.24	0.02	0.071
Upper sec./tertiary educ.	0.39	0.38	0.01	0.173
<i>Missing information</i>	0.24	0.26	-0.02	0.009
Health at birth				
Gestation (completed weeks)	39.6	39.6	0.0	0.812
Birth weight (grams)	3344	3343	1	0.927
Apgar score (5 min. after birth)	9.8	9.8	0.0	0.236
<i>Missing information</i>	0.15	0.16	-0.01	0.351


*Notes:* This table reports average characteristics for individuals in the treatment (column 1) and control (column 2) group. Column 3 shows the difference between the two group averages. Column 4 presents the *p*-value of the respective *t*-test. <sup>†</sup> refers to the years 2012 and 2013 <sup>‡</sup> is defined sex-specific.

Table 2: Estimated impact of the shopping voucher on health screening participation

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Shopping voucher (€40)	0.067*** (0.006)	0.067*** (0.006)	0.067*** (0.006)	0.067*** (0.006)	0.067*** (0.006)
Female		0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)
Age		-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Lives in Vienna		0.012* (0.007)	0.012* (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)	0.016** (0.007)
High income of principal parent			0.017*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	0.014*** (0.005)
Health check participation of principal parent				0.028*** (0.007)	0.027*** (0.007)
Mother's level of education (Base: <i>missing</i> )					
Compulsory					-0.011 (0.007)
Vocational/lower sec.					0.002 (0.006)
Upper sec./tertiary					0.009 (0.006)
Constant	0.024*** (0.002)	0.051*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.013)	0.035*** (0.013)	0.032** (0.015)


*Notes:* This table summarises estimation results of the effect of shopping vouchers on adolescent's health check participation. Each column reports coefficients from a regression of a binary indicator for health check participation on a binary indicator for the offered shopping voucher and varying control variables. The number of observations is 10,727. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the family level, \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Figure 1: Group-specific cumulative participation rate over time



*Notes:* This figure illustrates the cumulative share of participating adolescents in the treatment and control groups over time. The vertical line indicates June 1, 2014, the day from which the invitation letters were sent out.

Figure 2: Estimated impact of the shopping voucher in various sub-samples



*Notes:* The figure summarises estimation results of the effect of shopping vouchers on adolescent's health check participation. We split the sample according to sex of child, principal parent's citizenship, mother's level of education, principal parent's income, and their general health check participation. Table A.1 includes detailed estimation output. Next to the bars, we report p-values based on estimations using the full sample with interactions between the respective group indicator and all other covariates.

# Web Appendix

This Web Appendix (not for publication) provides additional material discussed in the unpublished manuscript “Paying Adolescents for Health Screenings Works” by Martin Halla, Gerald J. Pruckner, and Thomas Schober.

## A.1 Additional Tables and Figures

Table A.1: Estimated impact of the shopping voucher in various sub-samples

	(1) N	(2) Participation	(3) Estimate	(4) SE	(5) p-value
Female					
Boy	5,441	0.021	0.061***	(0.007)	0.221
Girl	5,286	0.027	0.073***	(0.008)	
<i>Panel A: Characteristics of principal parent</i>					
Citizenship					
Austria	7,939	0.024	0.072***	(0.007)	0.077
Foreign country	2,788	0.022	0.049***	(0.011)	
Income					
Low	5,103	0.019	0.056***	(0.008)	0.078
High	5,624	0.028	0.077***	(0.009)	
Health check participation					
No	8,635	0.022	0.059***	(0.006)	0.014
Yes	2,092	0.032	0.101***	(0.016)	
<i>Panel B: Characteristics of mother</i>					
Citizenship					
Austria	6,362	0.022	0.073***	(0.008)	0.069
Foreign country	2,584	0.031	0.048***	(0.012)	
Education					
Compulsory	1,242	0.023	0.029**	(0.013)	0.001
Vocational/lower sec.	2,731	0.017	0.078***	(0.011)	
Upper sec./tertiary	4,116	0.029	0.081***	(0.010)	0.164
Missing information	2,638	0.024	0.053***	(0.010)	
Income					
Low	4,594	0.027	0.053***	(0.009)	0.091
High	4,586	0.021	0.075***	(0.009)	
Health check participation					
No	5,720	0.024	0.058***	(0.008)	0.027
Yes	1,318	0.033	0.107***	(0.020)	
<i>Panel C: Characteristics of father</i>					
Citizenship					
Austria	6,270	0.025	0.073***	(0.008)	0.087
Foreign country	2,295	0.022	0.049***	(0.012)	
Education					
Compulsory	737	0.030	0.031	(0.019)	0.010
Vocational/lower sec.	2,417	0.017	0.075***	(0.011)	
Upper sec./tertiary	2,978	0.030	0.091***	(0.013)	0.084
Missing information	4,595	0.023	0.054***	(0.008)	
Income					
Low	4,339	0.020	0.055***	(0.008)	0.095
High	4,338	0.029	0.077***	(0.010)	
Health check participation					
No	6,523	0.023	0.061***	(0.007)	0.113
Yes	1,339	0.031	0.093***	(0.019)	

*Notes:* This table summarises estimation results of the effect of shopping vouchers on adolescent's health check participation. Each row reports the estimated treatment effect based on a separate regression. All regressions control for individual age, sex, and place of residence. Column 1 reports the number of observations. Column 2 reports the mean of the dependent variable for the control group. Column 3 reports the estimated treatment effect. Column 4 shows the corresponding standard error clustered at the family level. Column 5 reports p-values that are based on estimations using the full sample with interactions between the respective group indicator and all other covariates. \*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , and \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .



Figure A.1: Medical examination form (translated from German)

**ÖH**
  
ÄRZTEKAMMER

**ISVA**
  
IHRE GESUNDHEITSVERSICHERUNG

Gefördert von den Mitteln  
**GESUNDHEITSGEHEILE**  
 der österreichischen Bundesregierung  
 Gesundheitsministerium

**HEALTH CHECK JUNIOR**

**Respondent data**

Name

Insurance number

Date of birth

Gender:

male

female

Federal state

Vienna

Burgenland

**Medical history**

**current health conditions**

yes

no

unknown

Allergies diagnosed by doctor

Skin diseases

(e.g. neurodermatitis, hives)

Long-term medication

Pre-existing conditions and health problems (e.g. asthma, diabetes)

other abnormalities

**Immunization status**

all vaccinations by vaccination schedule

**(contracted) infectious diseases**

Perussis

Measles

Mumps

Rubella

Chickenpox

Scarlet

repeated middle ear infection

repeated bronchitis

repeated urinary tract inflammation

repeated angina

**Operations**

Type of operation(s), date

**Family history:**

Cardiovascular diseases

Diabetes

Seizure disorder (epilepsy)

Asthma/COPD

Cancer

mental illnesses

(e.g. depression, burn-out)

**for girls:**

first menstruation

Anomalies

which

which are missing

Remarks

Type of operation(s), date

Remarks

1/2

(a) Front page

**ÖH**
  
ÄRZTEKAMMER

**ISVA**
  
IHRE GESUNDHEITSVERSICHERUNG

Gefördert von den Mitteln  
**GESUNDHEITSGEHEILE**  
 der österreichischen Bundesregierung  
 Gesundheitsministerium

**Clinical diagnostic results**

**medical examination**

Height

cm

Weight

kg

BMI

Blood pressure

mmHg

Head

Hearing

Vision

Teeth

Throat (thyroid)

Heart

Lung

Stomach

Musculoskeletal system / posture

Spine

Pelvis

Thorax

Extremities

peripheral joints

Pubertal development

unuspicious

suspicious

Eating behavior

School / Family

Media behavior

Nicotine

Alcohol

Drugs

Coaching-Info

Health certificate

Contractor number:

Date, stamp and signature

Description of the anomaly

Remarks

2/2

(b) Back page

A.3

Figure A.2: Invitation letter sent to subjects between 9 and 11 years old (translated from German)



Figure A.3: Invitation letter sent to subjects between 12 and 17 years old (translated from German)



Sozialversicherungsanstalt  
für Arbeitsbeschäftigung  
Substituente Gesundheitsmanagement  
Wiener Hauptstraße 84-86  
A-1061 Wien

T 05 08 08-3571  
F 05 08 08-3572  
GMS@sva.at  
www.sva.gov.at  
DVR 0024244

Have you heard of Health Check Junior?

Your health insurance provider, the Social Insurance Institution for Businesses (SVA), offers a free preventive health screening for children and adolescents aged 6 to 17 years.

You can undergo this examination once a year at your family doctor or pediatrician. The examination helps to strengthen your health.

With the **Health Check Junior**, we would like to bring you close to the topic of health prevention. This means that you do not see the doctor when you are sick, but before. The doctor can identify and treat minor health problems before you have any symptoms.

Your doctor and the SVA are not only there for you to get well, they also help you to stay well.

Contact your doctor (pediatrician and general practitioner in Vienna and Burgenland) and make an appointment as soon as possible!

YOUR SVA-HEALTH INSURANCE



Mag. Peter McDonald



Take care of health and receive a shopping voucher worth 40€

Have you heard of Health Check Junior?

Your health insurance provider, the Social Insurance Institution for Businesses (SVA), offers a free preventive health screening for children and adolescents aged 6 to 17 years.

You can undergo this examination once a year at your family doctor or pediatrician. The examination helps to strengthen your health.


With the **Health Check Junior**, we would like to bring you close to the topic of health prevention. This means that you do not see the doctor when you are sick, but before. The doctor can identify and treat minor health problems before you have any symptoms.

Your doctor and the SVA are not only there for you to get well, they also help you to stay well.

For participation in **Health Check Junior**, you will receive a shopping voucher worth 40€ for Mariahilfer Strasse in Vienna as a thank you. The SVA will send you this voucher as soon as you have completed the medical check-up.

Contact your doctor (pediatrician and general practitioner in Vienna and Burgenland) and make an appointment as soon as possible!

YOUR SVA-HEALTH INSURANCE



Mag. Peter McDonald



GUTSCHEIN  
im Wert von 40 Euro

(a) Control group

(b) Treatment group

A.5